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The Effects of Intermarriage on the Earnings of Female Immigrants in the
United States
Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of intermarriage on the earnings of female immigrants in the United States.
The main empirical question asked is whether immigrant females married to US-born spouses have higher
earnings than those of immigrant females married to other immigrants. Using 1970 and 1870 samples of
IPUMS data, I estimate an earnings equation through OLS. I also correct for the labor force selection bias
using the Heckman procedure. I finally take into account the endogeneity of intermarriage and apply a
twostage least squares (2SLS) estimation procedure. I find that there is a positive marriage premium among
immigrant females in the United States but a negative intermarriage premium for exogamously married
females compared to endogamously married females. My results show that the longer the immigrant stays in
the host country, the higher her wages, which is evidence for the assimilation effect over time. I find some
evidence for a negative labor force selection bias among immigrant females. In other words, higher human
capital women may select themselves out of the labor force, while lower human capital women are working for
wages. Among those who are in the labor force, however, married females earn more than singles. I also
conclude that being an immigrant from an English-speaking country does not have any impact on wages. Both
premiums become statistically insignificant in difference from zero when 2SLS is used as an estimation
procedure.
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The Effects of Intermarriage on the
Earnings of Female Immigrants
in the United States
Milena Nikolova

Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of intermarriage on the earnings of
female immigrants in the United States. The main empirical question asked is
whether immigrant females married to US-born spouses have higher earnings
than those of immigrant females married to other immigrants. Using 1970 and
1870 samples of IPUMS data, I estimate an earnings equation through OLS. I
also correct for the labor force selection bias using the Heckman procedure.
I finally take into account the endogeneity of intermarriage and apply a twostage least squares (2SLS) estimation procedure. I find that there is a positive
marriage premium among immigrant females in the United States but a
negative intermarriage premium for exogamously married females compared
to endogamously married females. My results show that the longer the
immigrant stays in the host country, the higher her wages, which is evidence
for the assimilation effect over time. I find some evidence for a negative labor
force selection bias among immigrant females. In other words, higher human
capital women may select themselves out of the labor force, while lower human
capital women are working for wages. Among those who are in the labor force,
however, married females earn more than singles. I also conclude that being
an immigrant from an English-speaking country does not have any impact on
wages. Both premiums become statistically insignificant in difference from
zero when 2SLS is used as an estimation procedure.
I.

INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates the effects of intermarriage on the earnings of female
immigrants in the United States. The main empirical question asked is whether
there exists an intermarriage premium, i.e. whether immigrant females married
to US-born spouses have higher earnings than immigrant females married
to other immigrants. Studying the determinants of immigrants’ earnings is
important for several reasons. From an applied economics perspective, this
5

study adds to the deeper understanding of labor market processes such as
the transferability of human capital across countries. This research expands
the existing literature by estimating both the marriage and intermarriage
premiums for female foreigners. More precisely, I look at the wage differentials
between intermarried and non-intermarried females. From the vantage point
of sociology, intermarriage is important as it constitutes the highest degree
of assimilation of immigrants (Wildsmith, Gutmann, and Gratton, 2003).
From a public policy view, it is necessary to understand the implications of
intermarriage on the economic assimilation of immigrants in order to make
adequate public policy decisions. Lack of assimilation of immigrants may result
in social and political turmoil. Understanding of the processes of immigration
and assimilation is a necessary public policy prerequisite, especially given the
relatively big flows of immigrants in the United States.
In this paper, by intermarriage or exogamous marriage, I mean the de
facto marital union between a female immigrant and a US-born male. Any
immigrant married to a non-native will be considered non-intermarried or
endogamously married. 1
This research question has its theoretical foundations in the marriage and
assimilation literatures, and it belongs to the new branch of intermarriage
literature. The marriage literature finds that married men have higher incomes
than single men. Married men benefit from marriage as their spouses may
choose to specialize in household production to support the human capital
accumulation of their husbands, which would later lead to husbands’ higher
earnings (Becker 1973). At the same time, however, Becker (1985) argues
that because raising children and housework require more effort than other
household activities, married women are less productive in the labor market
than married men for similar human capital endowments. Empirical results
show that while the marriage premium is well established for males, there
might be a zero or a negative premium for women. Neumark and Koremann
(1992) find a positive female marriage premium but provide no compelling
explanation for it.
Duleep and Sanders (1993) suggest that the gap between actual and potential
earnings for the endogamously married females might not close over time, as
they may take dead-end jobs to support their husbands’ investment in human
capital. In other words, upon arrival, immigrant wives may work more than their
husbands to support them (Baker and Benjamin, 1997). Using Canadian data,
1

The terms “exogamous” and “endogamous” marriage are borrowed from Meng and Gregory’s paper (2005).
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Baker and Benjamin (1997) find empirical evidence for the family investment
hypothesis for endogamously married females. Given the family investment
hypothesis, decisions regarding the labor force for intermarried immigrants
may differ from those of non-intermarried immigrant females. In particular,
intermarried females might feel protected by their husband’s social networks
and financial support and might not feel the pressing need to perform to the
best of their ability or take jobs with long hours, etc.
According to the assimilation literature, upon arrival, immigrants have
lower earnings than natives because of the relative intransferability of skills
across countries, insufficient host-country language skills, lack of information
about the host country’s culture and labor markets, as well as other factors.
Chiswick (1978) proposes that this “initial earning deficiency” disappears as
immigrants spend more time in the host country and gain country-specific
knowledge and experience.2
The intermarriage literature is a new branch that unites the marriage
and assimilation literatures. Using Australian census data for four years,
Meng and Gregory (2005) were the first researchers to study intermarriage
as a mechanism for economic assimilation. When they take into account the
endogeneity of marriage, the intermarriage premium is 5% for men and 10%
for women. Meng and Gregory’s results cannot be extrapolated to the U.S.
case since the immigrant pools are different in the two countries. While they
account for the endogeneity of intermarriage, Meng and Gregory fail to correct
for the labor force participation selection problem, which may be particularly
severe in the female sample.3
Using French data, Meng and Meurs (2006) study the effects of intermarriage
on the economic assimilation process for female and male immigrants. They
propose that the intermarriage effects of economic assimilation should consist of
an improvement in the language skills and the acquisition of information about
the local labor markets. When individual characteristics and the endogeneity
of intermarriage are taken into account, the premium rises to between 25%
and 35%. The authors find that the magnitude of the intermarriage premium is
higher for individuals with better language skills.
2

In addition, as time spent in the United States increases, immigrants are more likely to move to jobs where 		
their productivity is higher, which is another explanation for the closing of the earnings gap (Chiswick, 1978).
3 With the labor force selection problem, we are concerned that the sample of working individuals is a nonrandom sample of the population since for those who are working, the reservation wage is below the market
wage. In this sense, the selection bias is equally valid for male and for female samples. In addition, the selection
bias could be present in the male sample as well since, just like females, males could be facing the same 		
constraints and responsibilities within the household (i.e. time to take care of children, housework, etc). Given
the traditional gender roles of females, however, it is generally agreed that the workforce selection bias is 		
greater in female samples than in male samples (Korenmann and Neumark, 1992).
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To date, Kantarevic (2004) is the only scholar to investigate the link between
intermarriage and the economic assimilation of immigrants using United States
IPUMS data for 1970 and 1980. He finds evidence for his selection hypothesis,
which is based on the assumption that the relationship between intermarriage
and assimilation is spurious, as the intermarried immigrants could well be a
self-selected sample of all married immigrants. In other words, he considers
a selection bias related to intermarriage rather than an endogeneity problem.
Even if the place of birth does not affect productivity, the birthplace of the
spouse may be related with work productivity. He further argues that this
could be due to omitting a characteristic such as personal charisma or physical
appearance. Kantarevic also examines the productivity hypothesis that native
spouses facilitate human capital accumulation of their immigrant partners,
implying that the earnings of intermarried immigrants must be statistically
significantly different than those of identical non-intermarried immigrants.4
Kantarevic finds a 2.5% premium for male intermarried immigrants, but the
premium disappears once he corrects for the selection bias.
Given the literature, the question that this paper asks remains unanswered.
Using IPUMS data for 1970 and 1980, and correcting for the labor force
selection bias and the endogeneity of marriage, this project contributes
to the intermarriage literature in at least two ways through (i) studying the
female sample to provide a fuller view of the United States labor and marriage
markets; (ii) studying both the intermarriage and marriage premiums among
immigrants. In Section II, I present the model. In Section III, I discuss the
data and methodology, followed by the empirical results in Section IV. Finally,
Section V offers the concluding remarks.
II. EMPIRICAL MODEL
The formal theoretical model is developed by Kantarevic (2004), based
on a standard immigrant earnings equation proposed by Borjas (1999). An
immigrant has the following choices of marriage: to marry endogamously (i.e.
marry another member of her own group or another foreign-born individual),
to marry exogamously (i.e. marry a native-born individual), or to remain single.
The individual’s objective is to maximize her lifetime utility, which is a function
of monetary and non-monetary gains associated with each type of marriage.
The expected earnings and the marital state depend on the human capital and
assimilation variables for each individual. The costs for each type of marriage
depend on the individual characteristics and alternative determinants of costs.
4

Human capital accumulation stemming from intermarriage can be only imperfectly observed or not observed at all.
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Based on Kantarevic’s theoretical model, following empirical model can be
developed:
Yit = α0 + α1 Marriedit + α2 Exogamousit + α3 Hit + α4 Ait + εit
(1)
where the dependent variable Yit is the log hourly wage, Married is a dummy
variable having a value of one for married females and 0 for singles, Exogamous
is a dummy variable having a value of one for exogamously married females
and 0 for singles and endogamously married females, H is a vector of human
capital and demographic variables (age, years of schooling, race, place of
birth, place of residence, etc), and A captures the assimilation variable years
since migration.5 A detailed description of the dependent variables and the
independent variables is available in Table 1 in the Appendix.
The regression equation for the Heckman labor force selection
correction model is similar to the wage equation (1). It is observed only when
the labor market wage is greater than the reservation wage for each female
immigrant, i.e when the income earned is positive. The Selection mechanism
is given by the following equations: 6
Selection Mechanism:
Zi* = γ’Wi + μi
Zi = 1 if Zi* > 0,
Zi = 0 if Zi* ≤ 0
Prob (Zi = 1) = Φ (γ’Wi),
Prob (Zi = 0) = 1- Φ (γ’Wi).
Regression Model:
Yi = α+ βiXi + εi observed if Zi = 1
(μ, εi ) ~ N[0,0,1,σε , ρ]
where Zi* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the female earns income, and equal
to 0 otherwise. Wi is a vector of human capital, demographic, and assimilation
variables, as well as indicator variables for marital status.7 The instrumental
variables used in the selection equation are the number of own children under
5 years of age, and the number of own children aged 5-18.
If the decision to intermarry is independent of the potential earnings,
we do not have an endogeneity problem and estimating Equation (1) with
OLS would provide consistent and efficient estimates of the true population
5 The squared term of the variable years since migration was dropped from the model because it was highly col		
linear with the age and years since migration variable. An English language proficiency variable would have
been a good additional assimilation variable. It is not included because of its unavailability for both sample years.
6 Greene (2007).
7 The maximum likelihood function for this model is given by Maddala (1983).
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parameters. The decision to intermarry, however, may not be independent of
the potential earnings, which makes the intermarriage variable endogenous.
There may also be a simultaneity issue as intermarriage could be a factor
causing and a result of economic assimilation. Since the nature of the marriage
decision is endogenous, equation (1) is estimated through a two-stage least
squares (2SLS) regression using the sex ratio and the probability of interethnic
marriage as the two instrumental variables.
III. DATA AND METHODS
The ideal data for this paper would be panel data where the same individuals
are traced over time. Due to the unavailability of such data, this paper, like the
study by Kantarevic (2004), uses two cross-sectional samples (i.e. pooled data)
- 1970 Form 1 State Sample and 1980 1% Metro Sample U.S. Census samples
of Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-98).8 These samples have information
on age at first marriage and the year of immigration, which are used in the
construction of a variable indicating whether an immigrant individual arrived
as single.9 Using at least two years of data allows to control for cohort and
ageing effects (Kantarevic, 2004). 10
The dependent variable in this study is the logarithm of hourly wage for
females (in 2000 real dollars), constructed by dividing yearly wages by the
product of average weeks of work and the average hours of work.11,12 The
independent variables fall in two categories: human capital/demographic and
assimilation variables (Table 1). The human capital/demographic variables are:
age 2
age, 1000 , education, three indicator variables for place of residence (West,
Midwest, South, where Northeast is the comparison group), six indicator
variables for place of birth (North America, South America, Central America
and the Caribbean, Asia, Africa, Other, where Europe is the comparison group),
three indicator variables for race (Black, Asian, and Other Race, where White
is the comparison group).13
8 The IPUMS-USA consists of thirty-eight samples drawn from every available census from 1850 to 2000. It
is not panel data, i.e. it does not trace the same individuals over time. Both samples are 1-in-100 national 		
random samples of the population. Sample availability, documentation and other information are available at
www.ipums.org/usa/.
9 Later samples do not have the information about age at first marriage
10 An ageing effect occurs among all cohorts when a variable changes independently as cohorts grow older
(Blanchard, Bunker, and Wachs, 2002). Cohort effects are independent of ageing effects and capture changes 		
affecting populations born at a particular point in time (Blanchard, Bunker, and Wachs, 2002). As Kantarevic
(2004) points out, the identification of each effect could be done with panel data or with at least several randomly
selected cross-sections, which allows for cohorts to be tracked across years.
11 As the information about weeks and hours worked in 1970 are only available in intervals, these variables were
recoded as having values equal to the average of each interval. For consistency, although direct, self-reported
information is available for 1980, the interval variables were used in the same way as for 1970.
12 The appropriate CPI (All Urban Consumers) was used in the creation of the real values of all dollar variables.
13 The most populous category for each variable was used as an omitted (reference) category.
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Age is used as a proxy variable for experience; given basic labor theory,
age 2
I expect a positive coefficient estimate on age. In addition, the variable //////
1000
accounts for the possible concavity of earnings as a function of age.14 I expect
a negative coefficient estimate on the squared term of age. Since education
increases marginal productivity and therefore wages, I expect a positive
coefficient estimate on years of schooling. The assimilation variable, years
since migration, is a count variable and I expect a positive coefficient estimate
on it. 15
The female sample is limited to foreign-born female singles and spouses,
aged 16 to 65. Using the variables for the length of marriage and year of
immigration, the sample is restricted to females who came to the United States
as unmarried.16,17 The female sample consists only of females whose native
language is not English. The rationale is that English-speaking immigrants
could assimilate at a faster rate than non-English speaking immigrants, thus
pulling up the average earnings of female immigrants.18 The male sample is
limited to individuals aged 14 to 70 to allow an age difference between actual
and potential spouses at both ends of the age distribution.
Next, the dummies endogamous, exogamous, and single are created.
The exogamous indicator variable has a value of one for all foreign-born
females who are married to the US-born male heads of households and whose
husband’s birthplace is the United States. It has a zero value for singles and
for endogamously married females. The endogamous indicator variable has a
value of one for all foreign-born females aged 16-65, married to foreign-born
male heads of households.19, 20
To correct for selection bias related to the labor force participation, two
instrumental variables are used in the Heckman procedure: number of own
children under age of five and number of own children aged 5 to 18. I expect
that having own children lowers the probability of being in the labor force. The
14 The division by 1000 is done to avoid scaling effects.
15 The square term of the variable was considered as an additional covariate to capture any concavity of the
earnings function over time but was not included in the main regressions due to collinearity issues.
16 In this paper, the category “separated” is treated as “married.”
17 Technically, even females who were married upon arrival have the chance to intermarry through divorcing
their spouses. Those who face the actual decision of intermarriage, however, are the non-married individuals
(i.e. divorced, widowed, and never married individuals) (Gregory and Meng, 2005).
18 This restriction was later relaxed and for comparison purposes, results from the full sample are provided in
Table 9 in the appendix. It is important to point out that the full sample regression results are not substantially
different from the main regression results.
19 The married sample of females in this paper is therefore limited to immigrant spouses married to heads. This
is a relatively good way to look at the data since 95% of the married men were heads of household and 5.5% of
the married women were heads of household. In other words, 94.5% of the married women were spouses.
20 A different specification check could be including a dummy variable for endogamously married females whose
spouses are non-US-born native English speakers. Table 10 provides the results from this model.
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probability of interethnic marriage and the sex ratio are used as instruments
in the 2SLS model to correct for the endogeneity of intermarriage. First, the
probability of interethnic intermarriage for females, is:
Zisg = (msg/Mg)/(ns/N)
where msg is the number of single (never married, divorced, and widowed) men
in state s of country of origin g (Kantarevic, 2004). Mg is the total number of
unmarried men in country of origin g in all states; ns is the number of unmarried
US-born males in a state s, and N is the total number of unmarried men in
all states. 21 The smaller the value of the probability of marrying within is, the
higher the likelihood of marrying a native spouse is.
The likelihood of intermarriage also depends on the sex ratio is defined
as:
SEXRATIOf = Mmsg/ Mfsg
where Mmsg and Mfsg are the numbers of males and females, respectively, in the
specific nativity-state group. The higher the sex ratio, the more likely it is for
the female to marry within her own native group.22
All four instrumental variables (number of children under age of 5, number
of children aged 5 to 18, sex ratio, probability of marrying within) theoretically
satisfy the exclusion restriction. The number of children in the respective ages
affects the decision to enter the labor force but does not directly affect wages.
Similarly, the probability of interethnic marriage and the sex ratio affect the
marriage decision but not wages.23
This paper uses three different estimation techniques: ordinary least
squares regression with robust standard errors (OLS), Heckman labor force
selection correction, and two-stage least squares (2SLS).24,25 I expect the OLS
estimates to be biased and inconsistent due to the selection and endogeneity
problems.26

21 The terms single (never married, divorced, and widowed) and unmarried are used interchangeably in this paper.
22 The instrument for the probability of marrying within could be thought of as measuring the relative availability
of foreign-born potential spouses over native potential spouses, while the sex ratio captures the relative avail
ability of foreign men to foreign women, i.e. the intra-nativity group competition for spouses.
23 The appropriate census weights were used in the creation of the sex ratio and the probability of marrying within.
24 The reference group in all models is singles.
25 Equation (1) is first estimated through OLS with robust standard errors to correct possible heteroskedasticity,
which is common in cross-sectional data. I also added the sample weights to make the regression representative
of the population data.
26 To address the selection problem regarding the labor force participation, the Heckman correction procedure is
followed with the number of own children in the respective age groups as instruments. To address the problem
that the choice of intermarriage is endogenous, the two-stage least squares procedure is performed using the sex
ratio and the probability of marrying within as instruments.
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IV. RESULTS
1. Summary Statistics
The final sample consists of 28,970 female immigrants, 11,313 in 1970,
and 17,657 in 1980. The intermarried females were 6,386 or around 50% of all
married females during both sample years. In 1970, the number of exogamously
married female foreigners was 3,299, or 55% of all married foreigners, and in
1980, the total was 3,087 or 45% of all married female foreigners. Table 2a shows
the places of origin for the most populous groups of female immigrants as well as
the percentage of exogamously and endogamously married, and single females.
Among the countries of origin with the highest share of exogamously married
females are Sweden (36% of all immigrants in the sample were exogamously
married), Germany (34% of all immigrants were intermarried), and Italy (29%
of all immigrants in the sample were exogamously married). The countries with
the lowest share of exogamously married females are India (12%), China (14%),
and Turkey (15%). The countries with the highest percentage of endogamously
married females are Yugoslavia (33%), Italy (31%), China (31%), and the USSR
(31%). Table 2b shows the intermarriage rates among individuals from the same
place of origin, measured by the proportion of exogamously married people of
all married individuals from the same country of origin. The countries with
the highest percentage of intermarried immigrants are Japan (73%), Germany
(71%), and the African countries (66%).
Table 2a: Major Places of Origin and Marriage Rates

Mexico
Central America
Cuba
South America
Sweden
Italy
Germany
Yugoslavia
USSR
China
Japan
India
Turkey
Africa
Number of Observations

Total
4,641
960
1,872
1,381
216
2,412
3,443
369
847
773
498
170
101
266

Exog
0.20
0.17
0.08
0.16
0.36
0.29
0.34
0.20
0.22
0.14
0.24
0.12
0.15
0.26
6,386

Std.dev
0.40
0.38
0.28
0.37
0.48
0.45
0.48
0.40
0.42
0.34
0.43
0.33
0.36
0.44

Endog
0.28
0.21
0.22
0.17
0.19
0.31
0.14
0.33
0.31
0.31
0.09
0.26
0.22
0.14
6,549

Std. Dev
0.45
0.41
0.42
0.38
0.39
0.46
0.35
0.47
0.46
0.46
0.29
0.44
0.41
0.34

Single
0.52
0.61
0.69
0.66
0.45
0.41
0.51
0.48
0.47
0.55
0.67
0.62
0.63
0.60
16,035

Std. dev
0.50
0.49
0.46
0.47
0.50
0.49
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.47
0.49
0.48
0.49

(1) The data on percentage intermarried reports the fraction of all individiuals of a particular place of origin who are married to a US-born
husband. Similar calculations were performed for the endogamous and single groups for both sample years
(2) The data are listed only for selected major places of origin
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Table 2b: Intermarriage rates among major groups

Mexico
Central America
Cuba
South America
Sweden
Italy
Germany
Yugoslavia
USSR
China
Japan
India
Turkey
Africa

Number Intermar
2,210
372
575
468
118
1,434
1,678
193
452
348
165
65
37
106

Mean
0.41
0.45
0.27
0.49
0.66
0.48
0.71
0.38
0.42
0.30
0.73
0.32
0.41
0.66

Std. Dev
0.49
0.50
0.45
0.50
0.48
0.50
0.46
0.49
0.49
0.46
0.45
0.47
0.50
0.48

(1) The data on percentage intermarried reports the fraction of all married
individiuals of a particular place of origin who are married to a US-born
husband for both census years
(2) The data are listed only for selected major places of origin

Table 3 shows the sample summary statistics for the intermarried and nonintermarried female immigrants. First, the age structure seems to be similar for
all three groups, where all groups have a younger average age in the 1980 sample
than in the 1970 sample. The exogamous group has spent more years in the US
on average than the endogamous group and the difference between the groups
is larger in 1980 than in 1970. The single group has spent the shortest amount
of time in the US among the three groups. On average, the exogamous group
has more years of education than both the single and the endogamous group
for both time periods and the single group has more years of schooling than the
endogamous group for both census years. The level of educational attainment
was higher in 1980 than in 1970 for all groups. The summary statistics on
husband’s years of schooling and real annual wages (in 2000 constant dollars),
and total family annual income (in 2000 constant dollars) are important for
putting the analysis in a family context. 27

27 Exogamously married females and their husbands on average have more years of schooling than endogamously
married females and their husbands. This is one example of assortative marriage, i.e. higher human capital men
marrying higher human capital women. This statistic could have potential effects on the work outcomes for
women. In particular, relying on the higher incomes and social networks of their husbands, exogamously married
females could choose to work less or choose not to take jobs that require a lot of effort.
14

Table 3: Sample Summary Statistics: Intermarried and Non-Intermarried Females
1970
Exogamous
Endogamous
Single
Mean
Std. Dev.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Mean
Std. Dev
Age
42.27
13.91
44.90
14.90
41.81
17.79
Years In US
30.33
16.38
29.02
17.79
23.43
17.02
Years of Schooling
13.91
3.44
12.21
4.21
12.73
4.18
Husband's years of schooling
14.36
0.71
12.93
1.70
Husband's real annual wage income
36,382
3,888
31,364
8,584
Total real family annual income
46,847
6,404
42,841
6,510
49,437
6,542
3,299
2,701
5,313
Number of observations
1980
Exogamous
Endogamous
Single
Mean
Std. Dev.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Mean
Std. Dev
Age
34.26
9.61
33.75
9.89
35.76
15.37
Years In US
19.61
7.61
15.34
8.03
14.74
8.23
Years of Schooling
15.21
3.52
13.88
4.21
14.05
4.09
Husband's years of schooling
15.21
0.78
13.60
2.23
Husband's real annual wage income
32,637
3,089
27,254
6,143
Total real family annual income
49,461
6,432
42,554
7,393
42,113
7,179
3,087
3,848
10,721
Number of observations

On average, the husbands of the exogamously married females have more
years of schooling than their spouses in both years, and the exogamously married
females have more years of schooling than the husbands of the endogamously
married females in 1970. The group with the lowest average level of education
is the endogamously married females in 1970 and their husbands in 1980. The
husbands of the exogamous group had higher average real annual wages than
the husbands of the endogamous group for both years. The average real annual
wages for both groups of husbands were lower in 1980 than in 1970. Similarly,
the average total real family annual income for the exogamously married
females was higher than that of their endogamously married counterparts for
both years. The singles had the highest total average income in 1970 and the
lowest average income in 1980.
Table 4 shows the average real hourly wage (in 2000 constant dollars) for
the exogamous and endogamous groups.
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In 1970, the average hourly wage was $15.91 for intermarried females,
$14.76 for non-intermarried females, and $13.79 for singles. In 1980, the
average hourly wage was lower for all groups, with the highest wage of $12.52
for the endogamous group, which is similar to Kantarevic’s findings for the
male sample. This could be reflective of the recessions during the 1970s or
could be a result of the quality of the immigrant pool in 1980. Table 4 also
shows the hours per week and weeks worked. In both years, singles had the
longest hours of work and weeks worked. In 1970, the endogamous group had
more average weeks worked and hours per week worked than the exogamous
group. In 1980, the exogamous group worked on average more weeks than
the endogamous group but the endogamous group worked on average longer
hours per week.
2.

OLS Regression Results
Table 5 presents the results from the earnings equation (1) estimated through
OLS with robust standard errors, the Heckman procedure, and the 2SLS. Let us
consider the OLS regression results, which I suspect are likely to be biased and
inconsistent given the selection bias and the endogeneity problem.
The coefficient estimate on the marriage dummy is positive and
statistically significant in difference from zero. In particular, on average, the
predicted value of the earnings of married female immigrants is approximately
6.2% higher than those of their single counterparts. This result is contrary to
Becker’s (1985) theoretical framework. It is important to point out that the
females in this particular sample are only immigrant females, who could have
different family experiences and work patterns than the average Americanborn woman. The coefficient estimate on the exogamous indicator variable
from the OLS regression is negative and statistically significant in difference
from zero. It indicates that the predicted value of the earnings for exogamously
married females is around 6.1% lower than that for the endogamously married.
The coefficient estimates on age and its squared term, which are statistically
significant in difference from zero, show that earnings are an increasing and
concave function of age. An additional year is expected to increase the predicted
value of the real hourly earnings of female immigrants by around 4.2%, holding
constant the influence of the other included independent variables.
An additional year of schooling is expected to increase the predicted
value of real hourly wages by around 4.5%, holding constant the influence of
the other included independent variables.
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The coefficient estimates on years of schooling is statistically significant
in difference from zero. Relative to the wages of immigrants born in Europe,
the predicted value of the earnings of the immigrants born in North America
are likely to be 22 % lower, holding constant the influence of the other included
independent variables. The coefficient estimates on the indicator for North
American origin is statistically significant in difference from zero.28 Relative
to earnings of European immigrants, the predicted value of the earnings of
immigrants born in South America, Asia, and Africa are higher, but the
coefficient estimates are not statistically significant in difference from zero.
Relative to the wages of immigrants born in Europe, the predicted earnings
of the immigrants born in Central America and the Caribbean are lower by
about 3.2%, holding constant the influence of the other included independent
variables. Relative to the earnings of immigrants born in Europe, the immigrants
born in other regions are likely to be approximately 5.6% lower, holding
constant the influence of the other included independent variables. Relative to
the earnings of immigrants living in the North East, immigrants living in the
Midwest, South, and West regions are lower. Relative to the earnings of White
immigrant females, the earnings of Black immigrants are around 6% higher,
holding constant the influence of the other included independent variables.
The coefficient estimates on Asian and other race are positive but not
statistically significant in difference from zero. The coefficient estimate on years
spent in the United States is positive and statistically significant in difference
from zero. In particular, each additional year spent in the United States
increases the predicted value of the real hourly wage by about 0.2%, holding
constant the influence of the other included independent variables. This result
suggests that an assimilation process is taking place, i.e. immigrant wages are
increasing as the number of years they spend in the host country increase. Last,
the coefficient estimate on the indicator variable for 1980 suggests that the
predicted value of the real hourly earnings in 1980 were 19.5% lower than those
in 1970, holding constant the influence of the other included independent
variables. This result could be an echo effect from the economic recessions in
1973 and 1979.29
28 The only North American country is Mexico, since immigrants from Canada are English-speaking and are not
included in the sample. The coefficient estimate on being born in North America changes its sign when the full
sample results are introduced in Table 9 but the coefficient estimate is not statistically significant in difference
from zero.
29 In general, the total private seasonally adjusted average real wages in 1980 were 5. 46% lower than the cor
responding value for 1970 for the US economy. Source: author’s calculations using BLS data. http://data.bls.gov.
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3.

Heckman Selection Correction Regression Results
Table 5 contains the earnings regression results, while Table 6 in the
Appendix contains the Probit results. In this section, I discuss only selected
results pertaining to the probability of being in the labor force and the corrected
earnings results. First, the Probit results indicate that most coefficient estimates
have the expected signs and are statistically significant in difference from zero.
As expected, being married, as well as the presence of own children, have a
negative impact on the probability of being in the labor force. The coefficient
estimate on the exogamous dummy indicates that relative to the endogamously
married and singles, exogamously married immigrants have a lower probability
of being in the labor force. Older age and having more years of schooling
increase the probability of working for wages. Relative to immigrants born in
Europe, immigrants born in all other places but North America and Central
America and the Caribbean, have lower probability of working for wages.
The coefficient estimate on the indicator for birthplace in North America and
Central America-Caribbean are both statistically insignificant in difference
from zero. Relative to immigrants living in the Northeast, immigrants living in
all other regions but the Midwest have a lower probability of being in the labor
force. The coefficient estimates on all three indicator variables for place of
residence are not statistically significant in difference from zero. All other races
have higher probability of working for wages relative to Whites, which is the
comparison group. Interestingly, the longer the immigrants stay in the United
States, the lower their probability of being in the labor force. As mentioned
above, these females could be supported by their husband’s income and status
in society. Last, immigrants observed in 1980 had a higher probability of being
in the labor force relatively to those observed in 1970.
The Heckman results indicate that the marriage premium is around 7%
and statistically significant in difference from zero. The intermarriage penalty
is around 6.1% and is statistically significant in difference from zero.30 The
coefficient estimates on all other included variables have not changed much
from the OLS results. The coefficient estimate on lambda is negative, but
not statistically significant in difference from zero, indicating that there is a
weak support for the negative selection bias in the labor force among female
immigrants. In other words, my results show weak evidence that higher human
capital immigrants are not working for wages. At the same time, among those
30 Kantarevic’s Heckman results for the male sample indicate a positive but insignificant premium. Correcting for
an intermarriage selection bias, rather than the endogeneity of intermarriage, Kantarevic calculates the
assimilation effect, i.e. the difference between the coefficient estimates on age (age squared), years since
migration (years since migration squared) over the two time periods.
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who are working for wages, there is a positive marriage premium and an
intermarriage penalty. One explanation for the marriage premium could be the
fact that the average age for both sample years of these immigrants is between
42-45 years for 1970, and 34-36 for 1980. More precisely, if these women have
own children, these children are possibly old enough to provide help with the
household chores and raising younger siblings. This additional help could
take away part of the effort for the mothers. As they do not need to put so
much effort and labor within the household, these women could improve their
performance at work, allowing them to earn higher wages than their single
counterparts. It is important to emphasize that foreign females could have
different work patterns and household experiences than the American-born
females. In addition, both the OLS results and the Heckman results show a
wage penalty for immigrants who are married to US-born spouses relative
to those married to foreign-born spouses. One possible explanation for this
penalty is that unlike the endogamous group, intermarried females do not face
the pressure to increase their productivity and performance on the job.31 In
light of the family investment hypothesis, an additional explanation of this
result could focus on the endogamous group. Non-intermarried females might
need to be more productive or take higher paying jobs than their intermarried
counterparts in order to support their husband’s investments in human
capital.
4.

Probability of Intermarriage and 2SLS Regression results
Table 7 in the Appendix shows the multinomial logistic regression results
for the probability of being intermarried for the exogamous and endogamous
groups.32 Most coefficient estimates have the expected signs and are statistically
significant in difference from zero. The probability of intermarriage is an
increasing and concave function of age since the coefficient estimate on age
is positive and the coefficient on the squared term of age is negative for both
groups. Relative to singles, more years of schooling increases the probability
of marrying exogamously and lowers the probability of being endogamously
married. Relative to being born in Europe, which is the omitted category, being
born in any other region but North America lowers the probability of being
exogamously married relative to being single. Relative to being born in Europe,
being born in any other region but Central America and the Caribbean lowers
31 As Table 3 shows, intermarried females enjoy both higher average husband’s income and higher total family
incomes than the non-intermarried immigrants.
32 The reference category is singles.
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the probability of being exogamously married relative to being single. Relative
to living in the Northeast, which is the omitted category, living in any other
region increases the probability of being exogamously married relative to being
single and lowers the probability of being endogamously married relative to
being single. Relative to being White, which is the omitted category, being Black
and Asian lowers the probability of being intermarried relative to being single,
while belonging to other races increases the probability of being intermarried
relative to being single. Relative to being White, being Black and Other race
lowers the probability of being endogamously married relative to single, while
being Asian increases the probability of being endogamously married relative
to being single. Spending more years in the United States increases both the
probability of being intermarried and being non-intermarried relative to
being single. Higher values for the sex ratio increases the probability of being
intermarried and being endogamously married relative to being single. The
relative availability of marriage partners from own ethnic group decreases the
probability of being married to a native relative to not being married at all
and increases the probability of being married to a foreigner relative to being
single.
In the 2SLS procedure, the decisions to marry and intermarry are treated
as endogenous. The results are shown in Table 5. Most coefficient estimates
are not statistically significant in difference from zero. I am only going to
focus on the coefficient estimates on the marriage indicators and the years
spent in the United States. Although none of these three coefficient estimates
is statistically significant in difference from zero, I am going to discuss their
economic significance. First, the marriage premium entirely disappears and
becomes a marriage penalty of over 100%. Second, the intermarriage penalty
is still negative and it more than triples in size. Third, the coefficient estimate
on years spent in the Untied States remains positive, suggesting an assimilation
effect of spending more time in the host country.
5.

Specification Check: Relaxing the Non-English Speaking Criterion
The regression results when the restriction that immigrants should come
from a non-English speaking country (NESC) is relaxed are shown in Table
8 in the Appendix. They serve as a specification check and do not show any
fundamental differences with the NESC results. The coefficient estimate on
the marriage premium is positive and statistically significant in difference from
zero from the OLS and Heckman results, and is negative and insignificant
from the 2SLS results, which is similar to the NESC results. The intermarriage
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income penalty is statistically significant in difference from zero from the OLS
and Heckman results and is negative and insignificant from the 2SLS results,
which is similar to the NESC results. The dummy variable for English speaking
country is negative and not statistically significant in difference from zero from
all three specifications. The years in the United States variable is still positive
but not statistically significant in difference from zero. Both assimilation
variables are not statistically significant in difference from zero, indicating that
adding the English-speaking immigrants to the sample diminishes the relative
importance of the assimilation variables for the wage equation. Most of the
coefficient estimates on the rest of the included independent variables are
similar to the NESC sample regression results.
6.

Specification Check: English-Speaking Immigrant Husbands
As an additional model specification check, I included a dummy variable
for the native English-speaking husbands of the endogamously married females.
The results in Table 9 in the Appendix do not show any major differences from
the previous specifications. Some results are worth addressing. The marriage
premium is still positive and significant from the OLS and Heckman results
and negative and not statistically significant in difference from zero from the
2SLS. It increases more than four times when the Heckman estimation is used.
The intermarriage premium is still negative but is not statistically significant
in difference from zero from the 2SLS results. The coefficient estimate on the
assimilation variable years in the US is statistically significant in difference from
zero only from the Heckman results. The coefficient estimate on whether the
immigrant female came from an English-speaking country is negative and not
statistically significant in difference from zero from all three specifications. The
dummy variable on whether the husband of the endogamously married female
came from an English-speaking country is negative and statistically significant
in difference from zero from the OLS results and positive and insignificant in
difference from zero from the Heckman and 2SLS results. This provides only
poor evidence on the effects of language on the assimilation dynamics and
earnings of immigrants.
7.

Further Discussion of Results
The differences between the Heckman method and the OLS are practically
small and are most likely due to the fact that the coefficient estimate on lambda
is not statistically significant in difference from zero. The Heckman results and
the 2SLS results differ significantly. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that
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they correct for different sources of bias, i.e. the Heckman procedure corrects
for selection bias while the 2SLS corrects for endogeneity.33,34 Both estimation
techniques provide consistent estimates in large samples. The Heckman results
are not as efficient as maximum likelihood estimates. The 2SLS have increased
variances and standard errors, which may explain the statistically insignificant
in difference from zero results. In addition, if the fit of the reduced form equation
is relatively poor, then 2SLS estimators will be still biased. The difference in the
results from the Heckman and the 2SLS procedures could also be reflective of a
poor choice of instruments for the 2SLS estimation. Given the shortcomings, the
Heckman results may be better estimates of the true population parameters. A
potentially superior estimation method will be a sample selection model with a
common dummy endogenous regressor in simultaneous equations. While this
estimation technique will allow us to tackle both sources of bias simultaneously,
it may be econometrically challenging. Particularly challenging aspects of this
estimation technique may involve establishing the sampling distribution of the
estimators and obtaining consistent and efficient coefficient estimates.
V.

CONCLUSION
This paper investigated whether female immigrants married to USborn spouses (i.e. exogamously married immigrants) have higher earnings
than female immigrants married to other immigrants (i.e. endogamously
married immigrants). I find that there is a marriage premium that is positive
and statistically significant in difference from zero even when I correct for the
labor force selection bias. One explanation for this premium could be that
married female immigrants have older children at home who can take care
of the household and release the burden on the mothers. This could make
these married foreign females more productive at work. In addition, I find that
exogamously married immigrants receive an intermarriage penalty. My results
show that there is a negative selection bias in the labor force among female
immigrants. In other words, higher human capital immigrants are not working
for wages. At the same time, among those who are working for wages, there is
a positive marriage premium and an intermarriage penalty. When I correct for
33 The 2SLS also corrects for simultaneity, or the fact that intermarriage can be both a cause and a result of
economic assimilation of immigrants.
34 The Heckman procedure deals with the problem that selection bias causes the error term to be correlated with
an explanatory variable (Kennedy, 2003). The Heckman estimates the probability of being in the labor force
first on the basis of a probit model and generates the Inverse Mills Ratio, which is used as an additional regressor
in the earnings equation (Gujarati, 22003). The Heckman estimator is consistent but not as fully efficient as the
maximum likelihood estimates (Kennedy, 2003; Kantarevic, 2004). 2SLS sweeps clean the dependent variable
of the influence of the error term by obtaining the estimator of Y from the reduced-form equation and then
replacing it in the original equation to produce consistent estimates (Gujarati, 2003).
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the endogeneity of the marriage decision, I find that that exogamously married
female immigrants still receive a penalty relative to exogamously married
immigrants. This premium is economically significant but not statistically
significant in difference from zero and no meaningful interpretations of it
can be done. The negative premium could be due to the fact that unlike their
exogamous counterparts, non-intermarried females do not enjoy the same high
husband’s income and husband’s social networks. Their motivation to perform
better on the job, therefore, could be stronger than that of the intermarried.
These results contrast the findings of Meng and Gregory (2005) and Meng
and Deurs (2006) for Australia and France, respectively, who find positive,
significant, and robust intermarriage premiums among immigrants. Kantarevic
(2004) finds a male intermarriage premium of about 2.5 %, which disappears
once the specification controls are introduced.
Given that the intermarriage literature is in its infancy, many interesting
empirical questions arise. In particular, further investigations of the marriage
premium among immigrant females could be done. Finding an alternative
estimation technique that will allow to handle both the selection bias and the
endogeneity simultaneously may be superior but econometrically challenging.
In addition, if data availability permits, the intermarriage premium could be
studied across different countries over time. Finding a different data might
allow for fixed and random effects, as well as adding occupational dummy
variables to account for some of the variation in the marriage premium.
The cross-generational effects, i.e. what happens to the premium in for the
descendants of the endogamously married and endogamously married females
are still questions that remain unanswered.
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